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TESTING AND APPLYING A THEORY 01;’ UTILITY 
AZR Attempt tu Decompose Income in Compensatory and Scarcity Rents* 
Nienke BOUMA and Bernard M.S. VAN PRAAG 
Economic htirute of Leyden Uni~ersify, Leyden, Z&e Il’eiherlands 
Jan TINBERGEN 
Data on income after tax, schooling completed, job held. age, and ‘levei of satisfaction’ of 
2663 members of the Dutch Consumer Union have been used to estimate regression equations 
of two types. Type I may be called a s;‘t”cification f a utility function, Type II an ‘earnings 
function’ (where income after tax was used as earnings). For both types a number of alter- 
natives were estimated both with regard to mathematical shape and with regard to variables 
included. Defining equitable or justified income differem% as differences which do not change 
the level of satisfaction, a formula for equitable incomes for given combinations of job, school- 
ing and age can ‘ir= derived from Type 1 equations. All regression cocffkienis are found to be 
lower than the corresponding earnings function coefficients. The latter can then be decomposed 
into a ‘compensatory’ component and a ‘scarcity rent’ component. 
1. Introduction 
Elsewhere one of us frinbergen (I 975)] s+*‘>mitted a theory of utility or welfare 
characterized by the following assumpt,sns: 
(i) Utility is a quantitative concept. 
(ii) It depends on entities to be distinguished as parcznteters and rariahles. 
Ideally para.meters constitute constants for a given individual (or, alterna- 
tively, household), characterizing its capabilities or its needs. Varinbles 
aaecting utility may vary either independently of the individual’s will or 
may be under his or her control. Independent variables may be the tax 
system; variables under control are, for instance, the individual’s occupa- 
tion and the income that goes with it. 
(iii) The mathemsiical form of the utility function and its coefficients are the 
same for all h:iman beings considered, since apparently different coefficients 
for different individuais may be taken to constitute parameters. 
*We are grateful to an anonymous referee for hk comments on an earlier draft. The authors 
alone are responsible for this text. 
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Of course the ‘theory’ so presented has been adhered to by others before. In the 
form chosen it may indicate a programme of measurements with decreasing 
oversimplification. Measurement has not so far been undertaken by many 
authors; one of us made some serious attempts D’an Praag (1971, 1973)], and 
there are a few more. 
In the present paper some or a11 of the foilowing parameters were used: 
II = years of schooling, considered to represent mainly intellectual capabilities; 
W = capability to take independent decisions; 
t = age, believed to represent also experience. 
The variables considered are: 
X = income after tax: 
S = xcupation. From other da b available to us for a smaller sample we 
derived the conclusion that an important job characteristic consists of 
years of schooling required, as distinct from actual years of schooling. 
For lack of direct data on schooling required we used three alternative 
measures of S, indicated as So, s2 and s3, and standing For the fower 
quartile of the distribution of D for each group of occupations considered, 
the median and the upper quartile. 
The scope of the present article is twofold, as indicated by its title. First, 
we used material colfected by Van Praag and Kapteyn (1973) on utility or 
welfare as declared by a sample of 2663 members of the Dutch Consumer Union 
and made an attempt to measure the coefficients of a utility function. Among 
the determinants of that function (covering both parameters and variables as 
defined above) we included some or all of the entities just summed up, plus a 
‘tension term’ supposed, in the original theory Finbergen (1975)], to codeter- 
mine utility. This ‘kasion theory’ had been mentioned earlier in a theoretical 
analysis pinbergen (1956, 1959)] and upholds that a difference between school- 
ing required and actual schooling is felt to be a burden both when positive and 
when negative. 
A second testing operation whose results are shown in this article consists 
of an attempt to explain incomes by an ‘incomes function’ comparable to the 
‘earnings function’ used by severa other authors [cf. Mincer (1974)], assuming 
that in that furtction the same determinants appear as in the utility function. 
We vvill refer to the two tests just mentioned as Type I and Type II tests. 
Type I tests have been performed with the aid of a logarithmic and a linear 
form ula, res,pectively, 
logo = ao+a, log X+a2 log s+a3 log v+a4 (log s/v)* 
+a5 log w+a, log t, 
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and 
where w stands for utility or welfare experienced by the individual. 
Type II tests have been carried out with the aid of three alternative formulae, 
namely, 
log X = b,+b, logs+b, log I,+bJogs/u)2+b5 log w 
+ b6 log t, (3) 
log X = bb+h;s+b; v+b;(s-v)2+6; w+b;, t, 
X/l000 = b;+b; s+b’; zl+b; (s--z+~+&; w+b;: t, 
(4) 
(5) 
The reason why both a utility function and an incomes function have been 
tested is that, applying another suggestion made by one of us, from the utility 
function. a criterion for an equitable income distribrrtiort is derived. This is the 
‘application announced in the title of this article. The criterion used is that 
equity requires equa’r satisfaction or utility for all. 
Setting 01 constant in (1) or (2) we may derive iso-utility-curves, described by 
eqs. (6) and (7), 
1ogX = co- : logs- 2 log D- 2 (log .Y/U)2 - Zlogw 
- 2 log t, (6) 
(7) 
They describe how earned income has to depend on the variables ‘required 
schooling’, ‘actual schooling’, the tension between them, the capability to take 
independent decisions and age in order that every individual is satisfied to the 
same degree. So (6) or (7) represent he ‘earnings functions’ in an ideal society 
with an eqyitable income distribution. (The value of the constant co determines 
the commori htility level.) These equations will be compare9 with eqs. (3) and 
(S), respectively, and enable us to find out whether the actual income distribution 
deviates, and by how much, from our concept of an equitable income distribu- 
tion. No use has been made ofeq. (4), since it did not perform better than (3). 
2. Material and units used 
As already indicated the material used consisted of the results of an enquiry 
made wittr 2663 members of the Dutch Consumer Union by Van Praag and 
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Kapteyn (1973). In fact, that enquiry showed data for 2815 respondents, but 
we removed from it the groups of retired, of those without profession, and of 
those temporarily unemployed. Thus we were left with family heads in ten 
diffsrent occufational groups. For them the material summarized in table 1 is 
available, as well as an estimate of each individual’s satisfaction w. Put briefly, 
this figure was derived from the procedure described by Van Praag (1968) 
azrd the observations reported on by Van Praag (1971) and Van Praag and 
Kapteyn (1973). 
The sample was fairly large: its 2815 individuals were selected at random 
from 3 larger sample of people who filled in a rather elaborate and laborious 
questionnaire, the answering of whnch took about 13 hour, and which had to be 
sent under anonymous cover to the Union. 
Since the Union is not completely representative for the Dutch population 
a- a whole our results are not wholly representative ither. However, from 
cross-comparisons of various frequencies in the survey with material representa- 
tive for the Dutch population, we do believe that our data form a fair approxima- 
tion of the Dutch population for the present purpose. 
The results of the enquiry may be summarized as follows: 
(I) There was ample evidence for the thesis that an individual welfare function 
can be estimated and is lognormal. 
(2) The parameter 0 varies about 0.5 and depends hardly on any objectively 
measurable individual characteristics o far available. 
(3) The parameter p can be explained quite well by objective characteristics 
such as net income, family size etc. 
Jt is well-known from lognormal distribution theory that 
ax; P, 4 = N(log x; p, a) = N log x-p ( ;OJ 9 u > 
where -W(a) denotes the normai distribution function, and N(* ; 0, 1) the standard 
normal distribution function. Jnstead of A it seems more appropriate to focus 
on (Jog X-jl),lu, being the more handsome expression. It has a one-one relation- 
ship to the ophelimity index o= 4(X; I-(, a). 
The units used for the other parameters and variables are net income X: 
g&lders per annum; schoo!ing u: years completed; schooling required si 
(i= I, 2.3): years; capability to take independent decisions w: a dummy variable 
to which the values I,2 and 3 have been assigned as indicated in table 1; age I: 
periods of 28 years. This choice was made in order to investigate whether the 
‘tension’ w--t is likely to play a role comparable to the tension S-O. The 
difference supposed to be a quadratic function, symmetric about zero, it seemed 
obvious to us that w and t had to be measured in such a way that (d~-r)~ or 
lrr(w:;‘~)~ satisfied this property more or less. This is the reason that we took a 
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period of 20 years as the unit of measuremo:t. No influence of w--t was found, 
however, 
3. Calculations carried out and testing results 
With the aid of the material described a large number of computations were 
performed, the main results of which are shown in tables 2 and 3, which are 
self-explanatory to a large extent.’ With respect o the quality of the explanation 
as measured by R2, we find that the quality is not bad, when we reali= that the 
size of the sample is 2663. For the ‘income function’ (table 3) these values are 
comparable to those found by other authors. In both cases the logarithmic 
formulae fit the material better than the linear formulae. Since the ‘mixed’ 
formula (4)-inspired by Mincers’ work although in a somewhat different 
context-did not fit the material better than eq. (3), only a few results of it are 
chown. A general feature of the results is that RZ is hardly affected by tfle choice 
between the three alternative s values. This is evident in Cases 06 through 08, 
13 through 15 and some more groups of three cases. This being so, Cases 02, 
12 and 22 have only been shown for sI. Since inclusion of all regressors led to 
non-significant regression coefficients (showing standard deviations wzfl over 
50 percent) no such cases have been shown. Whereas table 2 generaIly shows 
higher standard deviations than table 3, it can be stated nevertheless that X (in 
tabfe 2), v, IV, and t or their logarithms obtain significant and stable regression 
coefficients, with the intuitively expected algebraic sign. 
Turning now to table 2 we find that inclusion of s instead of ZI (Case 01 and 02) 
somewhat reduces R2 and yields a fess reliable coefficient to s than to v. The 
negative coefficient of log (v) in 01 suggests that there is a negative influence on 
satisfaction emanating from a higher intellectual capability, a conclusion also 
suggested by Cases 04’ and 09 for a linear utility function. Put otherwise, a 
higher intellectual capability creates cultura; needs. That the coefficient of s in 02 
is fess reliable may be due to the fact that s is an indirect measure only of 
schooling required, As for Case 01 it is ec~nc.micalfy not attractive to have no 
s-term, s representing the effort needed,. 
Cases 06 through 08 evnstitute a test of the ‘tension theor! ‘, assuming at the 
same time that there is no direct effect of intellectual capability on satisfaction. 
Here we observe that the coefficients of s are rather stable and that the selection 
of differen:. s-values has a considerable influence on the coefficient of the ‘tension 
term’ (fog ,Y,+J)~. The tension theory is only acceptable if we choose .sI (Case 06). 
Inclusion of the tension term, howtver, only marginally improves R2. The 
choice of sI can be defended on the argument hat it implies that 25 percent of 
‘The numbering of the cases shown is such that ihe first digit is 0 in table 2 and I,2 or 3 in 
the three compartments of table 3. The second digit characterizes a combination of regressors 
chosen. Cases with primes are dilfcrent from those without primes. 
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the labour force is not in the possession of schooling required, whereas taking sJ 
implies that 75 percent has Iess schooling than required, which is less probable. 
The two linear cases shown (04’ and 09) give no credit to the joint inclusion 
of s and (s- o)~. 
Table 3 gives clear support to the inclusion, in the income function, of o 
rather than s. Better results for the explanation of incomes are obtained by the 
inclusion of both s and F, independently of the choice of s, but only marginally 
better (Cases 13-15 compared with Case I I). Case 16 supports the tension 
theory, especially when compared with Case 12. Again the algebraic sign is 
only correct and significant if we select sl. Here RZ increases considerably in 
comparison to Case 12. 
Case 21 reconfirms that, for our measure s for schooling required, log X 
is explained significantly better with the aid of u than with the aid of s (Case 22). 
Inclusion into Case 21 of the tension term (Cases 23’ through 25’) yields signifi- 
cant and theoretically correct coefficients, but only marginal improvements of 
R2., Compared with Case 39, Cases 33’ through 35’, yield the same conclusions. 
Cases 36 through 38 also confirm what ~-7,s found in the upper compartment 
of the table (Cases 16 through 18). 
4. Application of the concept of an ‘equitable income distribution’ to the test 
results 
The highly significant coefficients in the regression estimqz; of the incomes 
function and the iso-utility curves enable us to apply the concept of an equitable 
income distribution as mentioned at the end of section 1. The concept enab!es 
us to derive from eqs. (I) and (2) an expression of log X or X/loo0 in terms of 
the variables ,r’ and the parameters tt, w and t which equalizes utility between all 
individuals (or family heads) considered. In table 4 the first lines repeat some 
regression results with respect to eqs, (1) and (2) already presented in table 1. 
The resulting ‘equitable’ incomes functions or equations are shown in table 4 
by the letter E. They are then confronted with the actual incomes functions A 
using the same regressors. Table 4 contains five such pairs. In all cases we find 
that E shows lower coet%cients than the corresponding .4 equations. The con- 
frontation enables us to split up the A coefficients into two components: 
(i) the numerical value in the E equation which represents a compematiort for 
assuming the ‘burden’ of a higher O, s, )t’, t or tension, and 
(ii) the difference between A and E coefficients which can reasonably bk called 
the coefficients of a ‘scarcity rent’ I?, also shown in table 4. 
From the figures we see that, roughly speaking, about me-half of the acruul 
income diflerences are itt this terminology scarcity rents and the other half com- 
pertsarions. We observe that we did not find negative ditrerences. This indicates 
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Table 4 
‘Equitable’ (E) and actual (A) income equations (log X or X/1000) and scarcity rents R: 
their dependence on parameters and variables considered and coefficient ratios CR.” 
- _ -._-_-. -----l_l_.--l_-- 
case log Y log s log v (log SW log w log t 
-_-- - 
1 0.797 n.i. 0.213 n.i. 0.079 0.40 
Eh& n.i. 0.27 0.10 0.50 
II Alog& :. 
R log :x*/&J Lf. 
0.44 n.i. 0.24 0.71 
0.17 n.i. 0.14 0.21 
CR 0.39 0.58 0.30 
--_ - 
2 0.7h4 0.105 n.i. n.i. 0.094 0.36 
E log Xl3 0.14 n.i. n.i. 0.12 0.47 
12 Ak%X* 0.38 n.i. n.i. 0.23 0.67 
R log (X, !&) 0.24 n’ hi. 0.11 0.20 
CR 0.63 i*,i. n.i. 0.48 0.30 . 
6 O.% 0.19 n.i. 0.22 0.881 0.37 
EhJ& 0.245 n.i. 0.28 0.10 0.48 
Hi A Isg X, 0.54 n.i. 0.46 0.20 0.67 
R log(XA/&) 0.295 n.i. 0.18 0.10 0.19 
C’R 0.55 n-i. 0.39 0.50 0.28 
~-- 
Case x:!!lOO S V (S-Vjz W t 
4 0.929 n.x 0.0067 R.S. 0.037 0.127 
E X,lHXW 0.23 iiS. 1.28 4.38 
34 A X~lOOO :kIO 0.54 0.39 2.85 7.31 
RXA-XE 0.0 0.31 0.38 1.57 2.93 
C-x 0.57 0.97 0.55 0.40 
.- --_-- -_- _-_I_ --~--_--- -- - 
9 0,029 n.i. 0.0069 n.i. 0.037 0.127 
E &/1000 n.i. 0.24 n.i. 1.28 4.38 
39 A X,~lUOO n-i. 0.67 n-i. 3.63 7.39 
R X,--& n.i. 0.43 1i.i. 2.35 3.01 
CR n.i. 0.64 n.i. 0.65 0.41 
Average CR 0.59 0.53 0.68 0.55 0.34 
--~-~ --- - 
%.s. means ‘non-significantly different from zero’, n.i. means ‘not included’. 
, 
that ail the vanables considered are scarce. M’e wonder whether this result will 
change in the Ilear future in view of the fact that there is an enormous increase 
in supply of higher-educated Iabour to be expected. In order to approach an 
equitable income distribution we should, if possib!e, try to reduce the scarcity 
rent, either by ‘creating’ more of the scarce capabilities or by/ finding a taxation 
device for the purpose. 
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5. conclusions 
Keeping in mind that the data used have not been speciafly gathered for the 
purpose for which we used them and that the sample is not completely represen- 
tative for the Dutch population we are inclined to summarize the preliminary 
results of this paper as follows: 
(a) It is desirable to collect direct data on ‘schooling required’ as distinct from 
‘actual schooling’; and some material has already been obtained. 
(b) With the material of the enquiry considered in this article the tension 
theory can not completely be dismissed, but it remains amarginal improvement 
only of any utility function or income function here considered. 
(c) In contradisninction to the doubts about the best measure for schooling 
required and the tension theory, the tests show a ctear and stable impact of 
income, actual or in some cases required schooling, capacity to take independent 
decisions ar.d age or experience on utility and of the latter four regressors on 
income. In later studies there will be possibilities to compare the coefficients 
found for the ‘Netherlands with those for some other countries. 
(d) About one-half of t5e actua? net-income differences can be explained as 
compensations for schooling differences, age differences, and the assumption 
of more or less responsibilities. The other half has to be considered as scarcity ’ 
rents generated in a ‘seller’s market,“. 
(ti) The scar ci y rents observed are always positive, indicating that ihere is t 
no oversupply of education, etc. at this moment. 
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